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Michel Sherif Mikhail12
Abstract
This paper looks at the methodological challenges and questions in the anthropological study of
religions. Such challenges start with the very language and definition of religion. This literature
review will first survey some of the available definitions and methodology already present in
literature, then it will compare and contrast them to find points of similarity and differences, and
lastly, it will offer two potential resolving approaches of such a deficiency in consensus. This
review will help put the multidisciplinary, theoretically diverse opinions in one context, which
may provide a helpful first step in understanding, and hence resolving, this tension.
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Having always been a focal point of humane inquiry, religion seems to challenge each and
every discipline that tries to look into it. It has gone through a pendulum of being an object of an
utterly metaphysical realm (i.e., theology), or, at the other extreme of the spectrum, a purely
empirical one (i.e., natural Science). Anthropology, being an inherently interdisciplinary
discipline, was a promising approach to the forever perplexing subject. Driven by a quest to
understand the Humanity of humans—to widen the perspective of the “other”, it had an inevitable
encounter with religion. Like every other discipline, it had its share of war wounds of challenges
in either definition, methodology, or the outcomes of the study of religion. This review looks at
the chaotic outcomes, which are far from rewarding for the "tidy mind", the methodology behind
the outcomes, and potential solutions for these challenges. First, it will survey some of the available
definitions and methodology already present in literature, then it will compare and contrast them
to find points of similarity and differences, and lastly, it will offer two potential resolving
approaches of such a deficiency in consensus.
Language seems to constitute the cornerstone from which such an attempt should initiate.
Despite being the first step, the definition of religion has not found a colossal consensus among
different theorists. This lack of consensus is better understood through Michael Lambek’s chapter
“What Is "Religion" for Anthropology? And What Has Anthropology brought for "Religion"? in
Companion to the anthropology of religion.” Lambek offers some definitions of “Religion”
alongside the basic inquiry methods that underlie these definitions. Thus, it is helpful to start with
the broad modes of “Moral Inquiry” for anything else to make sense.
Lambek makes it extremely clear that it is not a part of the anthropological view either to
“go native” while observing the religious practices" (reducing) them to neuroscience or anything
else” (2). Since for anthropology, “religion implicitly informs and underpins the worlds in which
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people live”, it is not at all possible to entirely deprive oneself of its force; and hence allowing for
a margin of fate (Lambek, 3). Is religion a pure product of the human mind of "fantasy and
projection" that must be treated as man-made superstition? Or does it border the limitations of the
mind, implying an authentic "transcendental experience? The answers to these questions,
highlights Lambek, are somewhat controversial and confusing. This is since anthropology, being
an interdisciplinary discipline, consists of different “epistemological standpoints” (Lambeck, 4).
Understanding any account of religion, be it on the levels of definitions, methods, or solutions, is
not possible without knowing the basic structure of these standpoints. In an attempt to narrow them
down, Lambek focuses on the three “rival versions of moral inquiry” provided by the philosopher
Alasdair McIntyre in The Encyclopedia, the Genealogy, and the Tradition.
The Encyclopedia is the most direct; "we simply define or recognise religion as an object
or natural kind and then describe and classify its manifestations" (quoted in Lambeck, 5). This is
closer to using more scientific/evolutionary language in tracing religion. It is, in simple terms, the
rationalist, descriptive, and explanatory approach. The second mode is Genealogy. It is skeptical
and deconstructing of the fundamental structure upon which the modes themselves operate.
Influenced by Foucault and postcolonial theories, the genealogists argue that social contexts that
make the question (i.e. What is "religion"?) possible is one of liberalism and secularism. The notion
that religion is an object to be "despised or admired, governed, and studied" is socially
contextualised within the colonial encounters (Lambeck, 5). Furthermore, it is this notion that
underlies the first mode of inquiry. Finally, the third mode is Tradition. It is interpretive and is a
"more relativist encounter between traditions, none of which is explicitly understood as either
epistemologically superior to or under direct hermeneutic suspicion on the other” (Lambeck, 5).
The most fruitful way to see these modes is to see them as merely not meeting at a single point but
not contradictory (Lambeck, 5).
The conjunction and integration between these methods shall yield, one might think, a
reconciled definition of religion. However, as Fiona Bowie puts it in her first chapter “Theories
and Controversies” of The Anthropology of Religion, the results are "less straightforward than
someone with a tidy mind might wish!" (2). Bowie surveys some definitions of religion, from
which I will mention just a few. The mentioning of such definitions shall give a considerable
insight into the underlying methodology construing such definitions and how converging (or
diverging) they are. Before surveying the definition, however, she emphasises a necessary
disclaimer—which will be discussed at length later in this review—that is that the language used
is based upon "European languages and cultures", and they do not necessarily respond to the same
"terms" in other parts of the world.
Bowie starts with the intellectualist definition of religion. As Edward Burnett Tylor puts
it, a minimum definition was "the belief in Spiritual Beings" (Cited in Bowie). Religions, for Tylor,
is one the humans' attempts "to make sense of the world" around them. Although this definition
does not but pose the question of the definition of "Spiritual Beings", it has, Bowie thinks, proven
durable. Another approach to religion would be the symbolist approach, whose most representative
figure is Clifford Geertz. Unlike the intellectualists, the symbolist approach kind of ignores the
explanatory function of religion. It instead seeks to look into what religions represent—how the
symbols and rituals "act as metaphors for social life.” An interesting critique is Horton's. He says,
as quoted by Bowie, that "structural symbolism", though a proper perspective, it remains secondary
to religion’s nature. It is similar to defining “the substance of 'linen' in terms of its occasional use
as a flag" (23). Other than the intellectualist/symbolist debate, an extended version of the definition
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that includes "the extraordinary, the mysterious, and the inexplicable" offered by Arthur Lehmann
and James Myers makes better room for anthropological investigation.
The approaches mentioned above, as well as the different views that rely on "what function
religion serves" or look into the genealogy of religion, are attempts to merely "categorise and
classify religion without really addressing the question as to just what it is we are looking at"
(Bowie, 25). It appears at this point that the controversial—though not necessarily opposing—
definitions of religion imply instability in the underlying structure of the methodology. It is thus
conducive to look into Bowie's take on another more methodological controversy, rather than
linguistic, on how to tackle religion from an anthropological perspective. She looks into three main
approaches: phenomenology, rationality, and “the politics of representation”.
Starting with the famous "methodologically agnostic" (i.e. phenomenological) approach,
the problem of religion becomes, as Bowie quotes Evans-Pritchard, a "scientific, not metaphysical
or ontological" (5). The anthropologist comparatively studies rituals and beliefs to know their
"social significance" and not their metaphysical truth. It is to describe other people's beliefs with
"as little comment and judgement as possible." The second approach Bowie investigates is the
rational treatment of religions. There are two opposing views in this approach. The first is of James
Lett, who believes that the anthropologist is obligated to "expose religious beliefs as nonsensical"
(7). As Stewart Guthrie puts it, the anthropologist is to "prove that all religion is a result of
anthropomorphism." This, more or less, corresponds with the current empirical stance.
On the other hand, Bowie mentions the other end of the spectrum of rationality by giving two
ethnographic examples of the "irrational" take on religion. The outcomes of these ethnographic
studies are better seen through the lens of "incommensurability", provided by Spies in Chapter six
included in Lambeck’s Companion to the Anthropology of Religion. However, it is very relevant
to mention these two ethnographic examples here.
The first one is Bengt Sundkler, a Swedish Lutheran missionary. In his account of Bantu
prophets in South African Independent churches, he clearly states both the advantages and
disadvantages of his position in this quote:
I found that the very fact that I was known as a missionary […] was a help when
trying to elicit the information I wanted…Experiences of related problems in the
work of one’s own mission church opened up new avenues of inquiry and research
(7)
Sandler sheds light on an "inevitable bias" in the quest of anthropological research; be it
an atheist or a Christian, the fieldworker will go through a conceptually similar sort of bias.
For Sandler, "the notion of disinterested social sciences is a myth". This constitutes a
remarkably valid critique of the "agnostic methodological" method. The second example
is Paul Stoller's study of the Songhay, in which he was a sorcerer's apprentice. Being
scientifically trained, his last note was a bit of a shock to both phenomenological and
rational approaches. Staller made sure to show the people that he was immersed in their
rituals, eating their "protecting powder" and saying their "incantations". Eventually,
however, as Bowie puts it, he "overstepped the mark between participant-observation and
active sorcery" that he had to run away. The experience forced him to confront the
limitations of his "western philosophical tradition" that underlies the approaches mentioned
above.
Staller’s experience hints, however, at the dynamic role of the anthropologist in an
ethnographic study. This dimension creates a particular personal gap between the "vivid
retelling of the fieldwork tales to friends, and the published monograph in academic
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anthropology" (11). This gap is because of the intense involvement of the anthropologist
in translation, which will be discussed in the next couple of paragraphs. Bowie emphasises
the notion of "translation" even in the most seemingly first-hand documentation, such as
photographs, documentaries, etc. She states, not in a critical manner, but rather in an
attention-grabbing way, that "the final product is crafted by interests, skill, and aesthetic
judgment of the anthropologist in relation not to the fieldwork subjects, but to an imagined
audience" (11). It remains an act of translation and should not be seen as an original replica
of reality. Concluding by one of the most practical perspectives on the function of an
anthropologist, Bowie states that the task of an ethnographer is to “interpret the views of
others in as honest and responsible a manner as possible, and to place these views and
practices within a broader theoretical framework (13).” However, there appears to be
another question standing out from this task, which is the possibility to place such a
subjective human phenomenon (i.e. religious experience, broadly speaking) in an
objective framework. This problem is methodologically tackled by Michael Agar in his
article Making sense of one other for another: Ethnography as translation.
Agar is hinting at the tension existing between the "emic/etic" descriptions of
culture. He thinks this tension was based on the model of phonetics and phonemics and
through translation, which allows for any link between “local specifics and human
universals”. Starting by explaining this model, which is very insightful studying at cultural
differences without going for an extreme of cultural relativism, Agar sets an analogy
between emic/etic approaches to phonemics/phonetics relatively:
Phonetics is an orthography for most possible sounds that a human can produce
given their articulatory equipment. Phonemics, in turn, uses that notation to figure
out the subset of those possible sounds that signal a difference to speakers of a
particular language. For instance, post-vocalic aspiration—a puff of air after a
vowel—is distributed differently in different languages. In some, it signals a
different word; in others, it does not. Nevertheless, any human can be trained to
hear it and transcribe it using phonetic notation. Phonetics is universal; phonemics
is specific to a language among some group at some point in time (Agar 1).
This analogy helps us see that emic and etic approaches are not different ways to look at a
distinct phenomenon, but rather, they are both present in any way of understanding. Agar’s
main task, however, is to look at the act of translating itself, which implies an existence—
though not yet straightforward—of a universal etic or a "broader framework", as Bowie
put it, which allows for different emic approaches.
Building upon Paul William Friedrich's concept of "linguaculture", Agar
established an edited version: Target Languaculture (TLC) and Source Languaculture
(SLC). As inferred by the names, a fieldwork translator translates SLC into TLC. It is
important to note, however, that this translation is rarely original. Equivalence is not
possible; it is either "domesticated" (i.e. more TLC) or "foreignized" (i.e. more SLC) (3).
It is as if, as mentioned in an example in the book Translating Cultures, given by William
D. Lutz, the ethnographer explains (X) in terms of English (A, B, and C). Consequently,
he says, neither of them can be a proper etic; they are mere "another emic." However, there
must be something in common, which allows for the fieldwork translation; what is it then?
Agar believes that we should look at the commons: "ethnography is about making sense
out of human differences in terms of human similarities” (5). This view will make more
sense in the light of Eva Spies’ theory of “Incommensurability.” Furthermore, at this point
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of emphasis on the space that allows for proper cultural (and linguistic) translation, one
cannot but mention the brilliant work of Lambek in his chapter Varieties of Semiotic
Ideology in the Interpretation of Religion.
Standing at the same ground as Agar, Lambek believes that semiotics plays a
massive role in the anthropological inquiry of religion. As Webb Keane means, Semiotic
Ideology is "basic assumptions about what signs are and how they function in the world"
(Lambeck, 137). Again, hinting at the interpretive role of anthropology, which Bowie
stated so clearly, he shows some linguistic stances for the functions of the "words." It is
not the definition of specific words that we should be concerned with, but rather, as
Wittgenstein believed, it is the understanding of their functions that should concern us.
Because although, as J.L. Austin thinks, ordinary words have an unconscious ability to
portray things with great fineness, there lies a danger of getting them wrong (Lambeck,
138). This is clear now, putting Lutz’s example into perspective; the perfect equivalence
of translation remains a matter of doubt. Semiotic ideologies grab our attention to the
implicit effect of the linguistic framework, in which both the ethnographers and the
subjects interact. Lambek goes as far as saying that one’s semiotic ideology not only affects
the act of translation, but it affects how one “approaches to words in religion, and hence to
religion itself” (148). This explains the different and somewhat controversial approaches
to the definition of religion mentioned in Bowie's first chapter; it varies with the subjects'
variability.
Moreover, all of this sheds light again on the gap that Agar emphasised. Even if the
(x) (in Lutz’s example) in the SLC corresponded with an (x) in the TLC, “it still will not
be equivalent, since the two (Xs) interact with different" beliefs systems. Lambek seems
to strongly agree with this view, saying that "insofar as words not only carry or convey
meanings, the very meaning of the word "word" itself can shift and may not be directly
translatable or commensurable from language to language" (148). This gap creates a
problematic crucial to the same methods of transmitting any foreign cultural discourse.
However, there are two ways, founded upon the same concept of discourse, which have the
potential to reconcile this problem: a) Spies’ theory of Incommensurability, which is more
general, and b) Agar's version of Goodenough's etic space (i.e. "the third space")
particularly concerned with the act of translation.
Agar's view of a "third space" view seems to imply that you cannot have a proper
emic experience with an already existent universal etic per se in mind, but rather, as
Goodenough puts it, one should opt to develop an etic space out of the comparisons of the
variation in the “universal human domain.” This space, as Agar describes it, has two crucial
features. The first is that it is “amazingly under-theorised”, and this under-theorisation is a
condition of possibility for the success of any translation whatsoever (42). Because if it
were theorised solidly, then the problem would instantly arise again. Secondly, as has
already been stated, everyone agrees that "exact equivalence in translation is never
possible" (42). This "third" space, as he puts it, is what allows for fruitful cultural exchange,
which then breeds "negotiations" between two cultural "hybrids". It is only in this "third"
space that the incommensurability approach will adequately function.
Spies starts her chapter “Coping with Religious Diversity: Incommensurability and
Other Perspectives” by a very important acknowledging of the plurality of the perspectives
present in fieldwork. This tension could be easily referred back to the etic/emic (or
phonetics/phonemics) tension highlighted in Agar's article and is also quite evident in the
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two ethnographic examples mentioned in Bowie's chapter. Consequently, she argues for a
“pluralistic approach, that is, an open hermeneutical way of understanding differences”
(Lambeck, 118). This incommensurability approach does not negate any potential
comparison between practices but rather calls for the exact thing that Agar was pointing at.
It "basically observes that different traditions (that) may not refer to the same frame of
reference and are not, therefore, always comparable on the basis of a single standard”
(119). This notion offers a way out from the extremes of "objectivism and relativism"
highlighted in Bowie's chapter, which seemed to induce this amount of controversies.
Incommensurability emphasises Agar's under-theorised "third space" by negating the
reference to any "meta point of reference" when trying to understand the relation between
two or more practices.
In conclusion, Spies's hermeneutical flexibility may not contribute to the
reconciliation between "reality and presentation". As she puts it, it "has been about refusing
to substitute one perspective for another" to "enlarge the universe of our discourse". In
these approaches of Spies and Agar, one may hope for actual reconciliation between the
anthropological scientific inquiry and the metaphysical nature of religion.
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